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NOTES
Underwater Mortgages for
Underwater Homes: The Elimination
of Signals in the Coastal Lending
Market
Climate change and sea level rise threaten to increase the default risk
of mortgages on homes in coastal areas. Faced with this reality, small coastal
lenders have begun selling more climate-sensitive mortgages to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, thereby transferring the risk of climate-induced default off the
lenders’ books. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a crucial role in supporting
America’s mortgage finance system by purchasing qualifying private home
loans, packaging them into investable security pools, and guaranteeing timely
payment of principal and interest to outside investors. Through selling
mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, lenders can use their increased
liquidity to fund additional mortgages. The effectiveness of this process,
however, is dependent on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac accepting high-quality
loans that carry minimal risks of default.
This Note argues that absent some form of intervention, small coastal
lenders will likely continue offloading their climate-induced default risk until
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac become so overleveraged that they can no longer
ensure a functioning secondary mortgage market and taxpayers are forced to
bail them out—akin to the 2008 financial crisis. Further, this Note seeks to
frame such harmful lending behavior as a general market failure, and, more
specifically, as a variation of the Lemons Problem. Using familiar solutions to
the Lemons Problem as guideposts, this Note attempts to curtail the
asymmetrical offloading of climate-sensitive loans through a mixture of public
and private mechanisms aimed at improving the ability of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to incorporate climate risks into loan purchasing decisions.

1467

1468

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1467

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................
I.
BACKGROUND ....................................................................
A.
Pre-Depression Mortgages .....................................
B.
Congressional Response .........................................
C.
Privatization and Securitization ...........................
D.
Loan Selection ........................................................
E.
Climate Change and Coastal Communities ..........
F.
Lending Trends and Elimination of
Market Signals ......................................................
II.
ANALYSIS: REDUCING THE INFORMATIONAL GAP—THREE
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES .....................................................
A.
The Lemons Problem .............................................
B.
Improve Flood Modeling ........................................
1.
Increase Funding ........................................
2.
Property-Specific Flood
Risk Assessments .......................................
3.
Coordinate Federal ClimateInformation Services ..................................
C.
Disclose Climate-Default Risk ...............................
1.
Centralize Federal Climate
Change Information ...................................
2.
Require Future Flood Risk Disclosure .......
3.
Educational Outreach ................................
D.
Warranties and Licensing .....................................
1.
Private Mortgage Insurance ......................
2.
Home Appraisal Standardization ..............
III.
SOLUTION: REORIENTING AND STANDARDIZING CLIMATE
INFORMATION ....................................................................
A.
Looking for Silver Buckshot, Not a Silver Bullet ..
B.
Centralize Climate Information ............................
C.
Provide Future Flood Risk Estimates....................
D.
Standardize the Real Estate Appraisal Process ....
CONCLUSION .................................................................................

1468
1471
1471
1471
1472
1474
1476
1477
1481
1482
1483
1484
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1495
1496
1497
1498
1500
1502
1504

INTRODUCTION
Government actors and mortgage lenders seemingly operate on
vastly different time horizons. Due to the long-term nature of their
investments, mortgage lenders and investors tend to evaluate a loan’s
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likelihood of repayment and risk of default over multiple decades. 1
Conversely, politicians and other decisionmakers are often fixated on
the present and solving immediate problems. 2 This is not to say that
politicians are not forward thinking, but rather they are less likely than
mortgage lenders to consistently factor long-term issues with unclear
solutions into their decisionmaking process. 3 Unfortunately, this
discrepancy may be steadily moving American taxpayers towards a
repeat of the 2008 financial crisis but this time in the coastal mortgage
market.
The government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) in the housing
sector—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—acquire mortgages from lenders
and are responsible for providing those lenders with immediate
liquidity and for providing investors with a secondary market, in turn
stimulating the widespread availability of affordable home loans. 4 Yet,
the effectiveness of this mission depends heavily upon the ability of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase mostly loans that carry a
minimal risk of default. 5 Since these GSEs are principally tasked with
ensuring a functioning secondary mortgage market, purchasing highrisk loans can threaten liquidity in the entire industry. 6 One emerging

1.
See URB. LAND INST., CLIMATE RISK AND REAL ESTATE: EMERGING PRACTICES FOR
MARKET
ASSESSMENT
6–7
(2020),
https://knowledge.uli.org/-/media/files/researchreports/2020/climate-risk-and-real-estate-emerging-practices-for-market-assessment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/844C-XYDF] (“Valuation has become more urgent for investors considering
longer time horizons.”).
2.
See, e.g., Roman Krznaric, Why We Need to Reinvent Democracy for the Long-Term, BBC
FUTURE (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190318-can-we-reinventdemocracy-for-the-long-term [https://perma.cc/57KT-M28H] (criticizing the short time horizons of
democratically elected politicians); Richard Fisher, The Perils of Short-Termism: Civilization’s
Greatest Threat, BBC FUTURE (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190109-theperils-of-short-termism-civilisations-greatest-threat [https://perma.cc/L68R-9PA4] (“[I]n politics
the dominant time frame is a term of office . . . .”).
3.
See William D. Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 187
(1975) (concluding that democratic systems with periodic elections will make short-term decisions
against the interests of future generations).
4.
See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (“The Congress
declares that the purposes of this subchapter are to establish secondary market facilities for
residential mortgages . . . .”); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185, 2195–96 (2007) (discussing Fannie Mae’s role of providing lenders with immediate
liquidity).
5.
See
Julia
Kagan,
Mortgage-Backed
Security
(MBS),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp
(last
updated
Sept.
03,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/P9BB-YWZK] (noting that the successful operation of the secondary mortgage
market depends on each participant correctly doing their job).
6.
See Peterson, supra note 4, at 2199 (explaining that investors saw mortgage-backed
securities (“MBSs”) as a low-risk investment because the GSEs “guaranteed the principal and
interest income even when mortgagors defaulted”).
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default risk is global climate change. 7 Rising sea levels, increasing
coastal flooding, and subsequent environmental degradation may
significantly devalue coastal homes over the next several decades and
lead homeowners to walk away from their mortgages rather than
continue paying. 8 Some alarming current market signals suggest that
local banks lending to coastal homebuyers may be selling large numbers
of these high-risk loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, effectively
transferring the risk of default due to climate change (“climate default”)
to American taxpayers. 9
This Note proposes a coordinate public and private law solution
providing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with better mechanisms to
evaluate and incorporate climate risk in loan approval guidelines,
which would prevent mortgage lenders from asymmetrically offloading
climate-sensitive loans onto the GSEs, thereby transferring unequal
risk to taxpayers. Part II provides necessary background on the history
and structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and examines the
forecasted impacts of climate change on coastal regions. Part III
identifies the current information asymmetry as a variation of the
lemons problem and establishes three guiding objectives necessary to
reduce asymmetries, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of
various public and private law approaches in relation to those
objectives. Part IV proposes a multipronged, hybrid solution combining
private initiatives with government intervention to close the
informational gaps that currently pervade the marketplace and compel
lenders and property appraisers to present Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac with more accurate risk assessments.

7.
See Jesse M. Keenan & Jacob T. Bradt, Underwaterwriting: From Theory to Empiricism
in Regional Mortgage Markets in the U.S., 162 CLIMATIC CHANGE 2043, 2043 (2020) (underscoring
the figure that over $1 trillion of private, coastal real property is at risk from climate change).
8.
See Amine Ouazad, Coastal Flood Risk in the Mortgage Market: Storm Surge Models’
Predictions vs. Flood Insurance Maps, ARXIV, at 2, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.02977.pdf (May 2020)
[https://perma.cc/255C-7DZN] (“Flood risk may cause defaults or prepayments among borrowers,
and cause losses among lenders and securitizers.”).
9.
Christopher Flavelle, Rising Seas Threaten an American Institution: The 30-Year
Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/climate/climate-seas-30-yearmortgage.html (last updated Mar. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/977C-7N3A].
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Depression Mortgages
The thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage 10 is currently America’s
most popular home loan, 11 but this has not always been the case. Prior
to the Great Depression, housing finance in the United States mainly
consisted of privately funded, short-term renewable loans with large
down payments, short maturity dates, and large balloon payments. 12
Additionally, the majority of funding for these loans came from various
life insurers, commercial banks, and thrifts. 13 Accordingly, the absence
of a national housing market made widespread homeownership difficult
since the “availability and pricing for mortgage loans varied widely
across the country.” 14 Extensive unemployment during the Great
Depression finally brought this issue to a head, as nearly a quarter of
the nation’s home mortgage debt was in default by 1933, 15 and lenders
quickly lost confidence in the mortgage-lending system. 16
B. Congressional Response
Congress responded to the Great Depression housing crisis with
two important creations: the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”)
10. Fixed-rate mortgages differ from other types of home loans in that the borrower’s interest
rate remains unchanged through the life of the loan, although the amount of interest and principal
paid each month may vary. James McWhinney, Fixed-Rate vs. Adjustable-Rate Mortgages: What’s
the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/mortgage/mortgage-rates/fixedversus-adjustable-rate/ (last updated June 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L3GK-P75K].
11. The Single-Fam. Team, Freddie Mac, Why America’s Homebuyers & Communities Rely
on the 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage, FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAM. (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://sf.freddiemac.com/articles/insights/why-americas-homebuyers-communities-rely-on-the30-year-fixed-rate-mortgage [https://perma.cc/67SA-FS2K] (“[A]bout 90 percent of homebuyers
chose the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage in 2016.”).
12. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HOUSING
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
ENTERPRISES
1
https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/History%20of%20the%20Government%20Sponsored%20E
nterprises.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZH8B-KJ7Z] [hereinafter GSE
HISTORY]. Balloon payments are lump-sum payments that a borrower must make to a lender at
the end of a mortgage’s term. Id. at 2. These payments are comparatively much larger than the
regular interest and principal payments that preceded them. Id.
13. Id. at 1. Thrifts are a type of financial institution that mainly specialize in offering
savings accounts and originating home mortgage loans. Id. at 2; Julia Kagan, Thrift Bank,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/thriftbank.asp (last updated July 31, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/5L5H-KRK2].
14. GSE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—A Catalyst for Change in Real
Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991, 992 (1986).
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and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”). 17 The FHA,
established in 1934, was tasked with providing federally guaranteed
insurance to home mortgage lenders. 18 This government-backed
insurance worked to insulate lenders from a borrower’s credit risk,
which ultimately facilitated mortgage loans with longer terms, smaller
down payments, and lower monthly installments. 19 Four years later,
Congress created the FNMA—better known today as Fannie Mae—to
provide further stabilization by establishing a secondary housing
market. 20 Fannie Mae originally helped augment the work of the FHA
by purchasing “nonconventional” FHA-insured loans 21 to provide
immediate liquidity to mortgage lenders and thereby encourage their
continued market participation. 22 Under this framework, qualifying
mortgages were guaranteed, and lenders could assign loans to Fannie
Mae for quick cash to recover investments. 23 This interaction between
the FHA and Fannie Mae effectively established a secondary market
that alleviated many of the lending-security fears which had initially
ground the federal housing market to a halt and that ultimately
induced various lenders back into the consumer home loan market. 24
C. Privatization and Securitization
Fannie Mae provided historically unprecedented levels of credit
security to Americans in the decades following the Great Depression. 25
17. Peterson, supra note 4, at 2195–96.
18. Id. at 2195. For those loans meeting FHA underwriting criteria, the government promised
to pay lenders the difference between the selling price of a repossessed home and the outstanding
loan balance. Id.
19. Id. at 2195–96. Although borrowers were able to obtain mortgages up to thirty years at
the agency’s inception, the thirty-year mortgage did not become a staple of FHA policy until the
mid-1950s when the FHA moved from twenty-year loans to thirty-year ones to counteract an
interest rate increase from the Federal Reserve. Edward Pinto, The 30-Year Fixed Mortgage
(Apr.
26,
2016,
6:30
AM),
Should
Disappear,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/04/26/30-year-fixed-mortgage/#7a10401c68e1
[https://perma.cc/7HQ5-G37J].
20. See Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (“The Congress
declares that the purposes of this subchapter are to establish secondary market facilities for
residential mortgages . . . .”).
21. A “nonconventional” loan is one that is backed by the government, while a “conventional”
loan is one that is not secured by the government. Investopedia Team, Conventional Mortgage or
Loan, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/conventionalmortgage.asp (last
updated June 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XHK5-4VXL].
22. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 2196 (“This secondary market outlet alleviated fears of
illiquidity, inducing many mortgage loan companies, insurance companies, and even commercial
banks back into the consumer home loan business.”).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2197.
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Credit-security growth was limited, however, by the federal
government’s desire to further certain policy objectives of its insurance
programs, such as improved housing for the military and the elderly. 26
Pressure from mortgage bankers looking to enter the conventional
market mounted as a result, 27 and Congress responded in 1968 by
splitting Fannie Mae into two separate entities. 28 One entity—the
Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”)—continued
Fannie Mae’s previous mission of purchasing nonconventional FHAinsured mortgages. 29 The other entity retained the FNMA name but
became a private, federally chartered corporation. 30 Importantly,
Fannie Mae was given a new directive to purchase non-governmentinsured home loans from private lenders. 31 Two years later, Congress
established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie
Mac”) to serve a similar role. 32
Originally, the housing GSEs managed their holdings under a
relatively stagnant framework where mortgages were simply
purchased and held in portfolios. 33 This structure, however,
dramatically changed with the advent of securitization. 34 Starting in
the early 1970s, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac (and later Fannie Mae)
“began issuing mortgage-backed securities that ‘passed through’
interest income to investors.” 35 Simply put, the agencies would
purchase conventional home mortgages, compile a large number of the
mortgages into homogenized “pools,” and then sell participation in the
pools to institutional investors. 36 These instruments provided investors
26. Id. at 2198.
27. Many mortgage bankers desired to penetrate the conventional loan market but lacked
the necessary capital and security to do so. Id.
28. Malloy, supra note 16, at 993.
29. Peterson, supra note 4, at 2198.
30. Private, federally-chartered corporations are also known as GSEs. See Troy Segal,
Government-Sponsored
Enterprise
(GSE),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp
(last
updated
Nov.
30,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/2ZJQ-AZAZ]. Instead of lending money directly to the public, GSEs guarantee
third-party loans and purchase loans on the secondary market to increase lenders’ liquidity and
reduce the risk of capital loss by investors. Id. Some examples of other well-known GSEs include
the Farm Credit System (agriculture) and Sallie Mae (education). Id.
31. Peterson, supra note 4, at 2198.
32. See Malloy, supra note 16, at 994 (explaining that although Freddie Mac was authorized
to purchase FHA-insured loans, it focused primarily on conventional loans).
33. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 2197 (Through Fannie Mae, “the government purchased
and held consumer borrowers’ promissory notes.”).
34. Id. at 2198.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., id. at 2198–99 (describing how MBSs work); Kagan, supra note 5 (defining passthrough MBSs).
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with a greater ability to hold large, diversified mortgage portfolios since
the GSEs guaranteed the principal and interest income of their
securities even when borrowers defaulted. 37 One important limitation
of mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”), however, is that their efficacy
is only realized when the principal actors properly perform their jobs to
mitigate large-scale default risk. 38 Banks must maintain reasonable
standards for accepting loans, borrowers must continue paying on time,
and credit rating agencies that review MBSs must perform sufficient
due diligence. 39 As evidenced in the 2008 financial crisis, if any of these
actors fail to uphold their end of the bargain, the system may crash. 40
D. Loan Selection
Before discussing the basis upon which Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac purchase loans, it is helpful to understand the different mortgage
credit classifications. There are three main categories a loan can fall
into: prime, Alt-A, and subprime. A prime loan, also known as a
conforming loan, is a loan that meets each of the eligibility standards
required for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 41 Conversely, a
subprime mortgage is a non-conforming mortgage that fails to meet
conforming loan standards by a substantial margin. 42 Between prime
and subprime loans are Alt-A loans—those mortgages that fail to meet
all conforming standards but only by one of the requirements. 43 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac primarily deal in the prime mortgage market as
these are the only loans the agencies will guarantee and purchase for
the secondary market. 44
As briefly mentioned above, a mortgage must meet a strict set of
underwriting criteria determined by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
before the agencies will purchase it. 45 Although the list of conforming
criteria is extensive, there are a few important standards worth
37. Peterson, supra note 4, at 2199.
38. See Kagan, supra note 5 (“This process works for all concerned as everyone does what
they’re supposed to do.”).
39. Id.
40. See id. (noting the failures of banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and credit ratings
agencies in the 2008 financial crisis).
41. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 716 (2009).
42. Id. at 719.
43. Id. at 718. An example of an Alt-A loan is one in which the borrower’s credit score falls
below conforming standards but not so low as to classify the loan as subprime. Id.
44. Troy
Segal,
Conforming
Loan,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/conformingloan.asp (last updated July 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/4WVQ-CDM8].
45. Schmudde, supra note 41, at 716–17.
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highlighting. First, the principal amount of most single-family
residential loans may not exceed a general conforming loan limit 46 and
must be less than eighty percent of the appraised value of the home. 47
Second, the borrower must have sufficient income and a good credit
score. 48 Third, and most important for the purposes of this Note,
mortgage lenders must obtain “appraisal reports with reliable opinions
of market value” before they can offload the loan. 49 More specifically,
Fannie Mae mandates that property appraisals be stated in “factual,
unbiased, and specific terms” and consider every factor that may impact
value, including the presence of unfavorable environmental and
economic conditions. 50 Certain environmental conditions can impose
further demands on borrowers and lenders as well. For instance, those
obtaining loans located in Special Flood Hazard Areas (“SFHA”)—as
designated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”)—must secure flood insurance before the loans are eligible for
purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 51
While restricting mortgage eligibility based on loan size and on
credit scores may help Fannie Mae reduce some default risk, those
requirements relating to environmental conditions may not provide
Fannie Mae with sufficient information to effectively mitigate default
risk in light of a changing global climate and rising sea levels. 52

46. Single-Family
MBS
Prospectus,
FANNIE
MAE
67
(May
1,
2020),
https://capmrkt.fanniemae.com/syndicated/documents/mbs/mbspros/SF_May_1_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XXU-8RPA]. The current general conforming loan limit is set at $510,400 for
most single-family residential dwellings. Id. As of 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency is
required under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act to annually review and adjust the general
conforming loan limits to reflect changes in the average U.S. home price. Segal, supra note 44.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(2). This percentage is commonly understood as the loan-to-value ratio
(“LTV ratio”) and describes the relative size of a borrower’s down payment compared to the
underlying value of the home. See Segal, supra note 44.
48. Schmudde, supra note 41, at 717.
49. FANNIE MAE, supra note 46, at 69.
50. Selling Guide, FANNIE MAE, at B4-1.1-02, https://selling-guide.fanniemae.com/SellingGuide/Origination-thru-Closing/Subpart-B4-Underwriting-Property/Chapter-B4-1-AppraisalRequirements/Section-B4-1-1-General-Appraisal-Requirements/1032987331/B4-1-1-02-LenderResponsibilities-09-04-2018.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HP45-BRUN].
Although Fannie Mae mandates consideration of all value-related factors, using unsupported
assumptions or perceptions about those factors is expressly prohibited. Id.
51. Flavelle, supra note 9; see also infra Part I.F (explaining FEMA flood insurance).
52. OFF. OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, SYSTEMIC RISK: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND
ROLE
OF
OFHEO
49
(Feb.
4,
2003)
THE
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/PaperDocuments/SYSTEMIC%20RISK.
pdf [https://perma.cc/D5BF-GNHV]; see also infra Part I.F.
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E. Climate Change and Coastal Communities
Global sea levels are commonly projected to rise one to four feet
over the next century, 53 and most scientists predict this phenomenon
will be accompanied by a higher prevalence of extreme weather events
and flooding episodes. 54 Such dramatic impacts from sea level rise
(“SLR”) and attendant extreme weather events will almost certainly
impose a wide degree of economic hardship on American citizens. 55
According to the U.S. Global Change Research Project, “over $1 trillion
of privately held coastal real property is at-risk from climate change in
the U.S.” 56 Logically, SLR is more likely to directly impact residents of
coastal communities given their proximity to the ocean, although some
regions may suffer more damage than others. 57 Many areas are already
experiencing the adverse effects of climate-related oceanic changes, like
SLR and increased flooding, in addition to changes more tangibly
connected to human activities, such as impaired infrastructure
development and habitat degradation. 58 Given current trends and the

53. Lint Barrage & Jacob Furst, Housing Investment, Sea Level Rise, and Climate Change
Beliefs, 177 ECON. LETTERS 105, 105 (2019); see also Michael Oppenheimer et al., Sea Level Rise
and Implications for Low-Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
321,
326–28
(Hans-Otto
Pörtner
et
al.
eds.,
2019)
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/11/08_SROCC_Ch04_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8MF-BWDL] (projections of future rise in global mean sea level).
54. See Jane Lubchenco & Thomas R. Karl, Predicting and Managing Extreme Weather
Events, 65 PHYSICS TODAY 31, 32 (2012); Timu W. Gallien, Nikos Kalligeris, Marie-Pierre C.
Delisle, Bo-Xiang Tang, Joseph T.D. Lucey & Maria A. Winters, Coastal Flood Modeling
Challenges in Defended Urban Backshores, 8 GEOSCIENCES 450, 450 (2018) (“Relatively modest
sea level rise (i.e., 0.50 m) will significantly increase flood frequencies.”).
55. See Francesc Ortega & Süleyman Taspinar, Rising Sea Levels and Sinking Property
Values: Hurricane Sandy and New York’s Housing Market, 106 J. URB. ECON. 81, 81 (2018); see
also ASS’N STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOOD MAPPING FOR THE NATION: A COST ANALYSIS FOR
COMPLETING AND MAINTAINING THE NATION’S NFIP FLOOD MAP INVENTORY 6 (Jan. 2020)
https://asfpm-library.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/FSC/MapNation/ASFPM_MaptheNation_Report_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MTB-7H39] (“Financial impacts of flooding are high and will be higher in the
future. Trends indicate that the federal taxpayer is paying a greater share of disaster costs than
any time in history.”); Gallien et al., supra note 54, at 450 (noting a predicted increase in coastalpopulation flood-risk exposure over the next fifty years and a dramatic increase in assets exposed
to 100-year coastal floods in the coming decades).
56. Keenan & Bradt, supra note 7, at 2043.
57. Oppenheimer et al., supra note 53, at 323 (“Coastal risk is dynamic and increased by
widely observed changes in coastal infrastructure, community livelihoods, agriculture and
habitability . . . .”). The relative impact of rising sea levels on a given coastal community are
unlikely to be uniform due to variation in community characteristics. See id. at 323–24; Gallien et
al., supra note 54, at 450 (noting significant variability in regional trends). The absence of identical
adverse impacts among costal areas, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no
impact will occur in a given coastal community. See Oppenheimer et al., supra note 53, at 324–25.
58. Oppenheimer et al., supra note 53, at 328, 371–73.

2021]

UNDERWATER MORTGAGES FOR
UNDERWATER HOMES

1477

scientific community’s general agreement regarding the likelihood of
future impacts, significant action will be necessary in the coming
decades to address and adapt to a changing coastal environment. 59
F. Lending Trends and Elimination of Market Signals
Many players in the real estate market already seem aware of
the current and future risks generated by global climate change and
have taken some steps towards mitigation. One study in particular has
found evidence that mortgage-lending banks are increasingly shifting
flood-prone mortgages off their books and onto Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. 60 Notably, the lenders selling off coastal mortgages the fastest are
smaller, local banks situated in coastal areas. 61 These banks likely have
a better understanding than larger national banks of which
neighborhoods face the greatest climate risk and are using that
knowledge to minimize their risk exposure. 62
Although banks may benefit from the practice, selling floodprone mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may have long-term
damaging effects on the real estate market as a whole. Specifically, the
practice may reduce or practically eliminate the accuracy of market
signals that investors and other lenders rely on to inform
business decisions. 63
Market signals are indicators that arise when a market
insider—a market participant who possesses information other market
participants do not have—takes action which triggers buying or selling
59. See J.A.G. Cooper & C. Lemckert, Extreme Sea-Level Rise and Adaptation Options for
Coastal Resort Cities: A Qualitative Assessment from the Gold Coast, Australia, 64 OCEAN &
COASTAL MGMT. 1, 1, 9–13 (2012) (outlining a range of adaptation options for coastal resort cities
to combat SLR and erosion). Although there is a general consensus among scientists that SLR will
increase the prevalence of coastal flooding events, there is more disagreement as to which flood
modeling methods are the best predictors. See Gallien et al., supra note 54, at 451 (discussing
different flood modeling methods). This disagreement, however, is largely due to the complex and
multifaceted nature of climate modeling. See id. at 452 (noting the multitude of variables that
must be factored into flood models).
60. Flavelle, supra note 9. Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are backed by the federal
government, this practice has effectively shifted the inherent climate risk of coastal mortgages to
American taxpayers. See id.
61. Id. In 2009, local banks sold forty-three percent of their mortgages located in areas
vulnerable to flooding from SLR. Id. By 2017, selling had increased; local banks were selling fiftyseven percent of vulnerable mortgages despite mortgages sales in less vulnerable areas remaining
constant. Id. Local banks have utilized other tactics to reduce the risk of climate-related losses as
well. See id. For instance, some banks have begun lending less money to home buyers in vulnerable
areas, thus increasing the size of initial down payments. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Keenan & Bradt, supra note 7, at 2044 (describing information asymmetry in coastal
lending markets).
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behavior by those who lack similar inside information. 64 Put differently,
market signaling describes the act of one market participant conveying
information to other market participants through the initial market
participant’s behavior in the marketplace. 65 If the insider sends
accurate signals reflecting their enhanced knowledge, the market as a
whole should operate more efficiently. 66
Where there are market signals, however, there are often
market failures. Generally, the term “market failure” refers to an
inefficient distribution of goods and services in the free market, often
resulting in negative externalities that impose costs on non-transacting
parties. 67 One prominent cause of market failures is the exploitation of
asymmetric information—where “one party to an economic transaction
possesses greater material knowledge than the other party.” 68
Even though most transactions are subject to a certain degree of
information asymmetry, exploiting these knowledge gaps can often lead
to inefficient transactions and increased risk exposure. 69 Consequently,
the efficiency of the market as a whole is largely dependent on insiders
sending signals that accurately convey their increased knowledge, so
the remaining market participants can adjust accordingly—thereby
reducing information gaps. 70
It follows that the current uneven distribution of SLR flood risk
caused by institutional information barriers has potentially contributed
to inaccurate determinations of mortgage risk that may not truly reflect
long-term asset performance and credit loss in coastal regions. 71 By
offloading increasingly flood-prone mortgages to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, coastal mortgage lenders have altered market signals
such that the signals no longer accurately reflect the riskiness of
64. What
Is
Signaling?
Definition
and
Meaning,
MKT.
BUS.
NEWS,
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/signaling-definition-meaning/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K8PQ-8PW3].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Market Failures, Public Goods, and Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/marketfailures.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/K9UX-CXZA]. Negative externalities occur when the costs and benefits of a good
or service are not reflected in its market price and are externalized onto other parties. Id.
68. Andrew
Bloomenthal,
Asymmetric
Information,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asymmetricinformation.asp (last updated Jan. 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/3X4N-CPJV].
69. See id. (noting the phenomenon of adverse selection—where one party exploits an
information asymmetry and ultimately exposes the other party to extreme risk of loss).
70. See Liudmila Zavolokina, Manuel Schlegel & Gerhard Schwabe, How Can We Reduce
Information Asymmetries and Enhance Trust in ‘The Market for Lemons’?, INFO. SYS. & E-BUS.
MGMT. 1, 21–24 (Feb. 18, 2020) (concluding that buyers had greater valuation success when they
were given more accurate product information, thereby reducing information asymmetries).
71. Flavelle, supra note 9.
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lending to coastal property owners. 72 Coastal lenders with greater
private knowledge of localized SLR flooding impacts are capitalizing on
an information asymmetry and externalizing their risk at the expense
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the market as a whole. 73
Unfortunately, a market failure of this type creates a cascade effect.
With Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac willingly accepting risky loans on
coastal homes, banks are incentivized to continue lending mortgages to
owners of properties subject to increased SLR flooding, loans that may
suffer substantial loss in value over the next thirty years and that stand
at a high risk of default. 74 Moreover, if banks have little reason to
curtail risky lending practices, it is conceivable that the availability of
borrowing opportunities will remain stable or increase for present and
future coastal homeowners, even as the riskiness of such loans grows. 75
Much of this market-signal interference is rooted in the
imprecise flood-insurance mapping of high-risk coastal areas performed
by FEMA as part of the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). 76
The NFIP was originally intended to protect homeowners from
expensive flood events at a time when most homeowners did not own
flood insurance, and it serves a similar purpose today where
homeowners may otherwise opt to forgo such coverage. 77 In short, the
federal government offers flood insurance to property owners and atrisk communities in return for a commitment that participating
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Loans for property that depreciate to a value less than that of the loan present a high risk
of default because the mortgage is worth more than the property itself, which often leads
homeowners to simply walk away. See Laura Agadoni, Walking Away from a Mortgage: An
https://www.millionacres.com/real-estateInvestor's
Guide,
MILLIONACRES,
financing/mortgages/walking-away-from-a-mortgage-an-investors-guide/ (last updated June 10,
2021) [https://perma.cc/QP56-ZQAW].
75. See Barbara Neumann, Athanasios T. Vafeidis, Juiliane Zimmermann & Robert J.
Nicholls, Future Coastal Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Flooding
- A Global Assessment, PLOS ONE, Mar. 11, 2015, at 2, 18 (noting the ongoing trend of migration
to the coast and predicting an increase in North American coastal migration in the coming
decades); Sarah Pralle, Drawing Lines: FEMA and the Politics of Mapping Flood Zones, 152
CLIMATIC CHANGE 227, 228 (2019) (“Flooding is costly and becoming more so as coastal population
density increases, development in flood zones continues, and other land use changes exacerbate
flood impacts.”). For an analysis and prediction of coastal flooding and population trends in the
world’s most populous port cities, see Susan Hanson, Robert Nicholls, N. Ranger, S. Hallegatte, J.
Corfee-Morlot, C. Herweijer & J. Chateau, A Global Ranking of Port Cities with High Exposure to
Climate Extremes, 104 CLIMATIC CHANGE 89 (2011).
76. Pralle, supra note 75, 229–30; see Ouazad, supra note 8, at 2 (“New estimates of floodplain
boundaries . . . suggest that up to 41 million Americans live within the 100-year floodplain,
substantially above the number of Americans living within the 100-year floodplain of FEMA’s flood
insurance maps.”).
77. Pralle, supra note 75, at 229–30.
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communities regulate development in flood-prone areas and enforce
flood-mitigating building codes. 78 FEMA is charged with providing flood
insurance rate maps (“FIRM”) that delineate areas subject to increased
flooding in participating communities. 79 Although participation was
initially low, community involvement has risen significantly since
Congress mandated flood insurance for properties with federally backed
mortgages, which began in the 1970s. 80
Thus, since flood insurance is required before a loan located in a
FEMA SFHA can be considered conforming, inaccurate mapping can
further widen the informational gap between lenders, borrowers,
investors, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Major concerns arise
regarding the accuracy of FIRMs as such boundaries are often outdated,
imprecise, and improperly influenced by political motivations rather
than an objective measure of flood risk. 81 Further, FIRMs do not show
variations in flood risk throughout and outside designated SFHAs,
leading homeowners, lenders, and the GSEs to perceive flood risk as a
binary measurement. 82 Additionally, the prospects of affordable flood
insurance and a government bailout may distort market signals in a
manner that underestimates the true cost of living in flood-prone areas
and actually encourages development in coastal communities. 83
Ultimately, if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to accept
these high-risk loans, much of the risk of default that is usually placed
on lenders may shift to American taxpayers. 84 While this Note generally
focuses on the offloading of risky coastal mortgages onto the GSEs, it is
primarily concerned with those mortgages on properties located outside
FEMA SFHAs, as these loans present the highest potential cost to
taxpayers in the event of default. 85 Events in recent decades have
78. Id.
79. See id. at 230 (discussing FEMA’s role in the NFIP indicating SFHAs—those areas with
a 1% chance of flooding in a given year—and base flood elevation levels).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 229, 233. Some of the mapping imprecision is due in part to the uncertainty of
impacts caused by climate change and a lack of accuracy in current prediction models. Id. at 229;
see also ASS’N STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 55, at 17 (“Over 3,300, or roughly 15%,
of NFIP communities have maps over 15 years old, with many of these over 30 years old and still
having ‘unmodernized’ paper maps. About 6,550 communities have never been mapped.”).
82. Howard Kunreuther, Susan Wachter, Carolyn Kousky & Michael Lacour-Little, Flood
Risk and the U.S. Housing Market 8 (October 2018) (Penn. Inst. for Urb. Rsch., Working Paper),
https://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Flood_Risk_and_the_US_Housing_Market.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JML4-W8GL].
83. Pralle, supra note 75, at 230.
84. See Flavelle, supra note 9 (noting the consequences of widespread defaults on mortgages
held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
85. Although taxpayers would still bear the cost of flooding for homes backed by governmentsponsored flood insurance, the argument there would be different because the argument would
suggest that actuaries need to better price the risk of SLR flooding into their insurance premium
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shown that unaddressed information asymmetries in the mortgage
market can lead to market failures that taxpayers must finance. 86
During the 2008 financial crisis, taxpayers shouldered the burden of
keeping Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac solvent after both agencies
acquired too many high-risk loans, to the tune of $187 billion in public
aid. 87 It follows that, without some reform, taxpayers may be faced with
a similar burden if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to accept
flood-prone coastal loans that carry a high climate-default risk. 88
II. ANALYSIS: REDUCING THE INFORMATIONAL GAP—THREE PRINCIPAL
OBJECTIVES
Information asymmetry and risk externalization create a
potentially disastrous combination for the GSEs and the mortgage
market. A knowledge gap currently exists between small, coastal
lenders and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regarding the climate-default
risk borne by properties along the coast. 89 Thus far, local lenders acting
on their greater knowledge have successfully transferred any default
risk attached to these properties to the GSEs, and the current legal
landscape has tolerated this activity. 90 Although a multifaceted
pricing. Notably, the risk placed on taxpayers in this realm may be significantly reduced moving
forward since the flood-insurance market—an area historically dominated by the federal
government—is now more accessible to private insurers. See Loans in Areas Having Special Flood
Hazards Rule, 12 C.F.R. pt. 22 (OCC), pt. 208 (Board), pt. 339 (FDIC), pt. 614 (FCA), and pt. 760
(NCUA) (2019) (final rule from major banking regulators).
86. See, e.g., Manoj Singh, The 2007–2008 Financial Crisis in Review, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/financial-crisis-review.asp (last updated Jan.
10 2021) [https://perma.cc/8C5E-HUY4]; Kimberly Amadeo, What Was the Bank Bailout Bill?, THE
BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/what-was-the-bank-bailout-bill-3305675 (last updated Oct.
26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z5LQ-AJDS].
87. Flavelle, supra note 9; see Kimberly Amadeo, Did Fannie and Freddie Cause the Mortgage
Crisis?, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/did-fannie-and-freddie-cause-the-mortgage-crisis3305659 (last updated Mar. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/26GG-ZBVB] (highlighting the risky loans
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquired leading up to the 2008 financial crisis). Although the GSEs
eventually repaid these funds, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conservatorships
under the direction of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Segal, supra note 30; History of Fannie
HOUS.
FIN.
AGENCY,
Mae
and
Freddie
Mac
Conservatorships,
FED.
https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--FreddieConservatorships.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KGD4-2QLM].
88. See Thomas Combs, Note, A Proposal for Regulation of the Government-Sponsored
Enterprises, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 759, 769 (2010) (explaining that market forces alone cannot be
expected to protect homeowners, taxpayers, or investors from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
considerable market influence).
89. See discussion supra Part I.F (discussing the information asymmetry in coastal mortgage
markets between the GSEs and local banks); Flavelle, supra note 9 (noting that coastal lenders
are offloading risky mortgages onto Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
90. Flavelle, supra note 9.
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problem, viewing this asymmetry through an alternative lens can help
identify guiding principles for reform that can be used by homeowners,
private actors, and government entities alike.
A. The Lemons Problem
An alternative way to describe this problem is as an outgrowth
of the “lemons problem,” an economic theory originally proposed by
economist George Akerlof. 91 For a paradigmatic example, consider a
scenario in which a potential buyer of a used car has an equal chance of
buying a “good” car and of buying a “lemon.” 92 If buyers are unable to
distinguish between cars that are good and cars that are lemons, 93
sellers with lemons are incentivized to falsely market their cars as
“good.” 94 Realizing this incentive, the buyers will offer to pay no more
than the average price for any given car to reduce their exposure to
loss. 95 By offering an average price, however, the buyers have
undervalued any good car purchased and overvalued any lemon
purchased. 96 More importantly, since those selling lemons stand to earn
a significant premium above their product’s true value, more lemon
sellers are incentivized to enter the market, thus driving out any
remaining good cars and potentially leading to a total market failure. 97
We can apply this theory to the coastal mortgage market: GSEs
(buyers) purchase mortgages (used cars) from coastal lenders (sellers)
who have a greater understanding of whether or not the mortgage is
subject to increased SLR flooding and climate default (a lemon).
91. See George A. Akerlof, The Market For “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); James Chen, Lemons Problem, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lemons-problem.asp (last updated Aug. 30, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/TCV9-KEQA] (defining the origins of the lemons problem and various solutions);
Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 407–
09 (2001) (describing the lemons problem and solutions in the context of financial regulation).
92. Akerlof, supra note 91, at 489. In a general sense, and as used in Akerlof’s article, a
“lemon” refers to a bad car (or product). Id.; cf. Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408 (describing
the “lemons” problem as it relates to capital markets).
93. Akerlof’s theory assumes that, due to information asymmetry, the seller of a used car has
greater knowledge of whether they own a lemon or a good car than the buyer. See Akerlof, supra
note 91, at 489. Thus, the seller is the only party to the transaction that knows the true value of
the car. Id.
94. Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408.
95. Id.; Chen, supra note 91.
96. Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408; Chen, supra note 91.
97. Akerlof, supra note 91, at 489–90; Patrick J. Glen, Law as Asymmetric Information:
Theory, Application, and Results in the Context of Foreign Direct Investment in Real Estate, 8
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 116, 119 (2011) (“Market failure is not a necessary end to this process, but it
is a possibility, as lower quality goods may increasingly drive out higher quality goods ultimately
causing the market for that good to cease to exist at all.”).
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Eventually, the good homes (i.e., homes subject to lower SLR flood risk
or homes sufficiently covered by appropriately priced flood insurance)
transferred to the GSEs will be driven out by the lemons, leaving
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac overleveraged as they continue accepting
an increasingly larger share of flood-prone mortgages—lemons. 98
To be sure, the intent of this analogy is not to ignore the
safeguards Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac already have in place, such as
an objective appraisal requirement, 99 but rather is to shed light on the
nature of the potential market failure and to frame the issue in context
of a familiar economic theory—one for which many well-documented
solutions exist. 100 In the following subsections, this Note discusses three
principal objectives that function as guideposts for resolving both
lemons problems generally and the distorted signals in coastal lending
markets more specifically. These objectives are (1) improving SLR flood
modeling, (2) increasing disclosure of climate-default risk, and (3)
providing warranties for risky coastal mortgages. For each objective,
public and private means of attainment are analyzed.
B. Improve Flood Modeling
One substantive critique of the lemons problem has suggested
that in a market where predictable transaction behavior exists, “we can
only be sure that bad products will drive out good if traders are
sufficiently shortsighted.” 101 Thus, given the likelihood of market
failure, one major goal of any solution offered should be to reduce
shortsightedness in the marketplace, which fosters information
asymmetry. 102 Improving the accuracy of SLR flood-modeling methods
and predictions will be helpful in minimizing legal myopia and
developing a clearer picture of the coastal mortgage market’s future for
both policymakers and market participants. Although the specific
modeling approaches are best left to those with climate-modeling
98. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 489–90; Flavelle, supra note 9.
99. FANNIE MAE, supra note 46, at 69.
100. See Akerlof, supra note 91, at 499–500 (highlighting institutions that counteract quality
uncertainty, such as guarantees and quality assurances); Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408
(noting optimal contracts, information disclosure, and information intermediaries as well-known
solutions); Chen, supra note 91 (pointing to information disclosure and warranties as possible
mechanisms for overcoming the lemons problem).
101. Geoffrey Heal, Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?, 90 Q.J. ECON. 499, 501 (1976); Glen,
supra note 97, at 120. Notably, Akerlof agreed with the essence of this claim, although he
suggested some counteracting institutions would alleviate any market-failure concerns stemming
from shortsightedness. Id.
102. See Heal, supra note 101, at 501 (“It should be clear that it is sufficient to have just one
shortsighted trader in a market for the inefficient outcome to result.”).
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expertise, there are various ways in which the public and private legal
sectors may provide mechanisms for accelerating modeling
improvements and increasing the accuracy of flood hazard maps. 103
1. Increase Funding
One of the more straightforward ways to improve flood-map
accuracy is to simply increase funding and appropriations for
government-sponsored climate research and SLR flood modeling. 104 At
a basic level, setting aside a larger sum of money for climate research
may lead to more promising research results 105 and better FIRMs,
which may in turn result in more accurate risk assessments that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac can factor into loan purchasing decisions. 106
Despite the attractiveness of this simple solution, two major
hurdles stand in its way. First, it is difficult to obtain significant federal
funding for issues as politically polarizing as climate change. 107 Thus,
the likelihood of obtaining funding sufficient to create a noticeable
impact on the quality of science and models is slim. Second, budget data
for public funds spent on climate change and climate science is virtually
nonexistent. 108 Without adequate knowledge of how federal funds have
103. See sources and discussion supra notes 76–83.
104. Necessarily included in this proposal is the federal government continuing to fund current
research and climate change projects. As much as new research may be needed, what may be
arguably more important is maintenance of, and improvements to, the existing informational
infrastructure. See Carolyn Kousky, Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood
Insurance Program, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 11, 28 (2018) (“[I]f FEMA is to be the institution
that produces nonregulatory maps for projecting future flood risk . . . then the process for doing so
needs to be designed and funded, following recommendations from the [Technical Mapping
Advisory Council].”).
105. Cf. Jue Wang & Philip Shapira, Is There a Relationship Between Research Sponsorship
and Publication Impact? An Analysis of Funding Acknowledgments in Nanotechnology Papers,
PLOS ONE, Feb. 19, 2015, at 1, 15–16 (concluding that grant-sponsored articles are more likely to
generate research interest and have a higher research publication impact).
106. In addition to increasing the accuracy of FIRMs and SLR projections, additional federal
funding for climate research would have positive impacts on climate science as a whole.
107. See Molly E. Reynolds, This Is Why the Congressional Budget Process Is Broken, WASH.
POST: MONKEY CAGE (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/10/27/this-is-why-the-congressional-budget-process-is-broken/
[https://perma.cc/4KQR-KNQT] (describing difficulties with the congressional budget process in
the current partisan political environment).
108. Maggie Koerth, How Much Is the Government Spending on Climate Change? We Don’t
Know, and Neither Do They, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 8, 2019, 9:55 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-is-the-government-spending-on-climate-changewe-dont-know-and-neither-do-they/ [https://perma.cc/X9AQ-5KYE]. This is not to say that
significant funds are not designated for climate research each year by the federal government. The
Environmental Protection Agency, National Institutes of Health, and Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention are just a few of the federal agencies involved in climate-change issues. See
generally INST. OF MED., CLIMATE CHANGE, THE INDOOR ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH 53–67 (2011)
(discussing how and which federal agencies are involved in climate-change issues).
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been spent on climate change research in the past, it may be practically
impossible to know what level of additional funding is required to
generate the desired improvements to coastal SLR flood modeling. 109
Given the difficulty of securing greater federal funding for
climate change research and SLR flood modeling, it may make more
sense to seek research grants from the private sector. This alternative
may allow research to proceed efficiently, without having to endure the
politically exhausting congressional appropriations process, as private
organizations often retain the flexibility to raise and spend capital in
ways the federal government does not. 110 Additionally, private funding
may be easier for individual applicants to obtain since federal funding
frequently requires lengthy proposals and complex applications. 111
Nevertheless, any gains achieved by seeking funding in the
private sector may be offset by the smaller size of private awards and
the unpredictability of funding renewal. 112 Smaller grants and
continual funding uncertainty threaten the ability of researchers to
collect meaningful data, and these factors likely also require that
significantly more funding opportunities arise in the private sector
before funding levels and research quality can match that generated by
the federal government. Further, the quality of privately funded
climate research may be called into question given the documented
relationship between industry funding and pro-industry research
conclusions. 113 Even if more accurate flood models were generated
through private grants, the peer review system and lobbying efforts
would need to be robust enough to convince federal agencies that the
research is appropriate for government application. 114 Therefore, while
on its face increasing funding may seem the most desirable response to
109. See Koerth, supra note 108.
110. See What’s the Difference Between Public and Private Grant Funding?, CAYUSE,
https://cayuse.com/blog/public-private-grant-funding-difference/ [https://perma.cc/E44C-66TJ]
(last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (noting that private grants potentially carry fewer regulations than
federal funding).
111. Id.
112. See id. (noting that funding awards for private research are typically smaller and less
likely to cover indirect costs than federal grant awards, which are regularly all-inclusive).
113. Cf. Lenard I. Lesser, Cara B. Ebbeling, Merrill Goozner, David Wypij & David S. Ludwig,
Relationship Between Funding Source and Conclusion Among Nutrition-Related Scientific
Articles, PLOS MED., Jan. 9, 2007, at 41, 44–46 (concluding that scientific articles about common
beverages were “approximately four to eight times more likely to be favorable to the financial
interests of the sponsors than articles without industry-related funding” and noting other ways
pro-industry bias can be introduced into research).
114. See Kunreuther, supra note 82, at 10. Until recently, there was little need for private
inland flood models due to the prevalence of FEMA’s NFIP. Id. at 9. Today, FEMA has authorized
two private flood models for use in flood mapping. Id. But these private models represent only a
fraction of the models currently available. Id.
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close the informational gap, it may present more problems than it solves
and could ultimately result in prolonged inaction.
2. Property-Specific Flood Risk Assessments
Another potential way to improve FEMA’s flood modeling and
close the informational gap between borrowers, lenders, and the GSEs
is to update the benchmark by which FEMA determines SFHAs. 115
Currently, FEMA defines the boundaries of an SFHA as “the area that
will be inundated by the flood event having a one-percent chance of
being equaled or exceeded in any given year.” 116 Put differently, an
SFHA is comprised of properties that fall within the 100-year
floodplain. 117 While FEMA also includes areas falling within a 500-year
floodplain in FIRMs (0.2 percent chance of flooding in any given year),
these properties are neither included in SFHAs nor are their owners
required to hold flood insurance. 118 Though a helpful measurement in a
relative sense, delineating flood risk using the 100-year floodplain
generates a false belief among all parties to a mortgage transaction that
a home’s flood risk stops abruptly at the boundary and that properties
outside the SFHA are safe from floods and the need to purchase
insurance. 119 An example of the harms this misconception can bring is
the recent flooding of Houston, Texas, where from 2015 to 2017, the city
experienced three 500-year floods, including those generated by
Hurricane Harvey. 120 These floods inundated areas situated outside of
the 500-year and 100-year floodplains, and in the case of Hurricane
Harvey, roughly eighty percent of homeowners did not have flood
insurance to protect their losses. 121 Potentially more harmful is the
effect that using the 100-year floodplain may have on perceptions of risk
115. Kousky, supra note 104, at 28.
116. Flood Zones, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/glossary/flood-zones (last updated July 8,
2020) [https://perma.cc/E5VK-LKXH=].
117. See id. (alternatively describing a one percent annual chance flood as a “100-year flood”);
Kousky, supra note 104, at 13–14 (describing properties subject to a 100-year flood as falling within
the 100-year floodplain).
118. FEMA, supra note 116.
119. Kousky, supra note 104, at 13. Additionally, FIRMs may not even accurately capture all
one percent annual flood risk facing a given area, for instance from localized stormwater drainage.
Id. at 14.
120. Dara Lind, The “500-year” Flood, Explained: Why Houston Was so Underprepared for
Hurricane Harvey, VOX (Aug. 28, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2017/8/28/16211392/100-500-year-flood-meaning [https://perma.cc/NRE5-BLLG].
121. Bernard Condon & Ken Sweet, About 80% of Hurricane Harvey Victims Do Not Have
Flood
Insurance,
Face
Big
Bills,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/08/29/hurricane-harvey-houston-flood-insurancedamages-claims/611910001/ (last updated Aug. 30, 2017, 3:03 PM) [https://perma.cc/X3DTUWLY].
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over time, as it may not accurately convey dynamic flood risk over the
life of a mortgage. 122
To combat deficiencies in current practices, some academics
have proposed transitioning to a property-specific flood risk assessment
model, which evaluates and communicates the flood risk faced by each
property individually. 123 Instead of delineating SFHA boundaries using
generalized measurements of one percent annual flood risk over a given
area, properties would be analyzed for their individual flood risk based
on the most up-to-date flood models. 124 With more individualized longterm risk assessments, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be able to
better determine the riskiness of their purchasing behavior and make
appropriate adjustments to their loan selling criteria.
Transitioning from the 100-year floodplain to an individualized
assessment, however, would be a costly endeavor, as it would require
FEMA to revisit every FIRM—and every property within those
FIRMs—to update SFHA boundaries. 125 In fact, the Association of State
Floodplain Managers has estimated the up-front cost of providing
updated nationwide flood maps to be $4.5–$7.5 billion, with annual
maintenance costs of $116–$275 million. 126 Such significant costs would
be difficult to overcome in terms of obtaining necessary funding and
government support, though there may be indications that the benefits
of such a transition could exceed the costs of updating the FIRMs. 127
3. Coordinate Federal Climate-Information Services
A final way to improve coastal flood modeling—and one equally
relevant to Section III.C of this Note—is to create or direct a federal
entity to coordinate among federal, state, and local authorities with
regard to climate projections, climate observations, and general climate
information. 128 Nearly forty federal entities are presently engaged in
climate-information efforts, including individual climate programs,
initiatives, and information collection systems. 129 While this is certainly
good news, the lack of coordination among federal entities engaged in
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the dynamic nature of climate change and SLR).
Kousky, supra note 104, at 28.
See id.; FEMA, supra note 116.
Kousky, supra note 104, at 13.
Id.
Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-37, CLIMATE INFORMATION: A NATIONAL
SYSTEM COULD HELP FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR DECISION MAKERS USE
CLIMATE INFORMATION 47 (2015).
129. Id. at 11, 16.
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climate-information efforts is troubling and has made it more difficult
to meet the needs of decisionmakers in the public and private sectors. 130
Stakeholders in the climate-modeling community have stated that
“decision makers are vastly underserved by the current ad hoc
collection of federal climate information services.” 131 With various
agencies competing with one another and failing to share vital climate
information, it is likely that SLR flood modeling is not as robust as it
could be if federal agencies cooperated. 132
One potential roadblock to this solution is that the federal
agency directed to coordinate climate-information efforts may already
be overextended and thus unable to effectively prioritize creating a
cohesive climate-information network. 133 If the agency selected to carry
out this task is preoccupied with other projects, it is unlikely that
coordination efforts would produce valuable results or that substantive
improvements to current flood models would be made.
In any case, the course of action selected to improve flood
modeling must effectively balance the need to enhance our current
understanding of flood risk with the likelihood of successful adoption.
Though some options may be more enticing than others given their
prospect of improving flood data, those that are realistic in light of the
current social and political climate are preferred.
C. Disclose Climate-Default Risk
One classic solution to information asymmetries and the lemons
problem is to simply close informational gaps. 134 Although several gapclosing mechanisms exist, one of the simplest and most direct methods

130. Id. at 16 (“[T]he climate information needs of federal, state, local, and private sector
decision makers are not being fully met, which hinders their planning efforts.”).
131. Id.
132. See id. (“[T]hese programs are uncoordinated, operate as separate information systems,
and fail to share information and learn from each other, partly because of turf battles between
them.”).
133. See Jeff Tollefson, Can Joe Biden Rebuild the Ravaged US Environmental Protection
Agency?, NATURE, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03585-7#correction-0 (last
updated Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QC9Z-BGUD] (explaining that before President Biden
can implement his desired policies, he must first prioritize restoring the agency’s science-minded
focus). Although the EPA is not the only candidate for coordinating climate-information systems,
it is certainly the most obvious given its environmental role. Other agencies may be equally suited
to guide cooperation throughout the federal government, such as the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”).
134. See, e.g., Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408 (“Another potential solution to the
information asymmetry problem is regulation that requires managers to fully disclose their private
information.”).
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is to mandate disclosure of insider information. 135 That is to say, the
chances of reaching an optimal outcome increase when sellers are
required to honestly inform the buyer as to whether or not the product
is a lemon, or at least provide the buyer with information allowing them
to make that determination. 136 Similarly, addressing the distortion in
coastal mortgage market signals will likely necessitate bringing Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac up to speed on the true value of the home loans
they acquire and the risk those loans face. 137
1. Centralize Federal Climate Change Information
As discussed above, one possible approach to reducing
information asymmetries between borrowers, lenders, and the GSEs
could be to direct a federal entity to coordinate and consolidate climate
information. In addition to potentially generating more accurate flood
models, concentrating climate information into a more manageable and
accessible network could provide decisionmakers access to necessary
information that has existed but was previously too fragmented to
find. 138 Put differently, much of the climate information that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac would need in order to identify mortgage loans
that face a high climate-default risk has already been collected, but the
federal government’s failure to provide an effective mechanism for
communicating and translating this information to decisionmakers has
rendered its use impractical. 139
An obvious strength of this option is that it directly addresses
the information gap that exists between the GSEs and coastal lenders.
If one of the major solutions to the lemons problem generally—and the
issue this Note raises specifically—is to align the information buyers
and sellers have access to, then directing a federal entity to more
135. Id.; see Barclay Palmer, What a “Lemon” Product Is, and How to Avoid Purchasing One,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/11/solutions-to-lemon-problem.asp (last
updated Feb. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZJT4-4UGE] (listing solutions to the lemons problem).
136. Healy & Palepu, supra note 91, at 408. This disclosure requirement tends toward a more
efficient outcome because the buyer is now aware of the true value of the car being purchased and
can offer an optimal price in return. See id.
137. See id. (noting that closing informational gaps through mandatory disclosure of private
information is a well-known solution to the lemons problem).
138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 128, at 15–16 (“[F]ederal, state, local,
and private sector decision makers may be unaware that climate information exists or unable to
use what is available, making it harder to justify the current costs of incorporating climate change
into planning efforts for less certain future benefits.”).
139. See id. at 18 (explaining that although the federal government does an excellent job of
collecting and archiving climate data, it has largely failed to effectively communicate this
information to decisionmakers).
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efficiently coordinate, compile, and disseminate climate information to
public and private bodies is a particularly apt way of leveling climate
information in coastal mortgage markets. Creating an informational
hub, however, may not be as simple as it sounds given many federal
agencies may not have the resources to accomplish such a directive. 140
2. Require Future Flood Risk Disclosure
Another possible way to increase disclosure of climate-default
risk is to change what aspects of a mortgage’s climate risk are shared.
As they stand now, FIRMs essentially provide a snapshot of the flood
risk a community faces today. 141 Yet, the effects of climate change, and
consequently climate-default risk, are dynamic, shifting, and subject to
variations over the coming century. 142 As flooding continues to increase
in the future, still shots of present-day flood hazards will become
increasingly irrelevant. 143 And while it might be helpful to generate
more data on future risks, it means little if there are no public or private
policy mechanisms in place to alert borrowers, lenders, and the GSEs
about how flood hazards will change over the life of a mortgage. 144 Thus,
making information about how flood risks will change over the life of a
mortgage publicly available, or perhaps even requiring FEMA to
research and disclose such findings, would prove useful in equipping
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (along with borrowers and lenders) with
the most accurate information of a loan’s evolving risk.
Improved disclosure could be accomplished in a number of ways.
A public governance approach could seek to promulgate guidance, rules,
or regulations that require FEMA to publicly disclose estimates of
future flood risks and the GSEs to incorporate such information into
loan selection decisions. This approach assumes that accurate
projections of future flood risk already exist in an accessible place and
that FEMA would share a useful, albeit complex, array of climate
information with the GSEs, rather than less informative metrics. 145
140. See source and discussion supra note 128.
141. Kousky, supra note 104, at 14. Even so, FIRMs may not accurately map today’s flood
hazards in a community due to outdated modeling techniques. Id. at 13.
142. See id. at 28 (noting changes in U.S. flood risks projected to occur over the next century).
143. See id. (discussing how current FIRM information is not an appropriate indicator of
future flood risk given predictions of increased flooding).
144. Id. at 14 (“Even when information on future risk may be available, no policy mechanism
currently exists to alert residents about how flood risk may change over the time they own a
property or over the life of a mortgage.”).
145. See id. (“Since 2001, communities have been able to request that FEMA show how a fully
developed watershed would alter the SFHA, but FEMA has not prepared maps showing how
erosion, sea-level rise, or changing precipitation patterns would alter flood risk.”). For this option
to be effective, the future-flood-risk information must be in an accessible place. It does little good
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Additionally, the effectiveness of a regulatory approach is predicated on
the belief that a future administration would not end any flood-hazarddisclosure programs. 146
Increasing disclosure of changing flood risks through the private
sector may be a viable option as well. This option could take any number
of forms, the simplest being an annual informational campaign alerting
certain residents of their homes’ flood risks and providing Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac with supplemental statistics to better quantify
mortgage risks. Like other private sector solutions, lack of funding and
organization may stand in the way of any disclosure efforts.
3. Educational Outreach
One final option for increasing default-risk disclosure is to
simply tell people about flood risks and the long-term impacts SLR may
have on coastal mortgages. Although an educational campaign may not
seem as directly helpful in aligning information asymmetries between
the GSEs and lenders since it would be directed towards individual
homeowners, bringing homeowners up to speed on the probability of
climate default may create benefits to the market as a whole (such as
decreased purchasing of flood-prone properties) and reduce the need for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to take major actions in the future. 147
FEMA currently has such a marketing campaign in place—
FloodSmart—which serves as the main outreach tool for educating
residents about their flood risk. 148 FloodSmart is primarily operated
through the website FloodSmart.gov but has also run television, radio,
and print advertisements to help promote the program’s messages. 149
Notably though, it does not seem that any studies have been
commissioned to evaluate the effectiveness of the FloodSmart
if the data and projections exist but are unreachable because the information only becomes useful
when it is accessible by the parties who need it.
146. See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Brady Dennis, Darryl Fears & Sarah Kaplan, The Energy 202:
Trump’s Budget Seeks Cuts to Climate Research and Renewable Energy Programs, WASH. POST
(March 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy202/2018/06/27/the-energy-202-white-house-seeking-more-clean-energy-cuts-despitecongressional-opposition/5b327bab1b326b3967989c90/
[https://perma.cc/SS8Y-V44L]
(highlighting President Trump’s proposed budget cuts to climate programs across multiple
agencies).
147. See Kousky, supra note 104, at 14 (mentioning how the NFIP’s current outreach and
marketing campaigns have been directed towards residential homeowners since they make up the
majority of NFIP policyholders).
148. Id.; FLOODSMART, https://www.floodsmart.gov (last visited Sept. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/4AFX-S2JR].
149. Kousky, supra note 104, at 14.
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program. 150 Thus, what this option really proposes is a study of the
effectiveness of the FloodSmart program, which could help identify
shortcomings of the outreach campaign and inform decisionmakers how
to better allocate funding within the program. 151
This alternative is not without weakness. Funneling limited
money into studies of a public outreach campaign may not be the best
use of funding since there is no guarantee meaningful change will
result. 152 At best, a study would uncover weak areas of the FloodSmart
campaign and alert decisionmakers to those weaknesses. At worst, the
study may simply tell decisionmakers the program works well as
advertised and recommend few, if any, changes. While this information
is still beneficial, funds may be better spent elsewhere. 153
D. Warranties and Licensing
Another prominent solution to the lemons problem, and one
suggested by George Akerlof himself, is the implementation of
warranties or guarantees that provide various protections and quality
assurances for buyers. 154 Importantly, offering warranties shifts the
risk from the buyer to the seller of the product, so that the seller is put
on the hook for ensuring the quality of the goods. 155 Offering warranties
for mortgages subject to SLR flood risk may aid in transferring some of
the long-term risk of default from the GSEs (and taxpayers) to the
lenders offloading these loans. 156 In a similar vein, licensing may also
work to reduce quality uncertainty and counteract the lemons
problem. 157 Under a licensing framework, some form of certification is
150. Id. (“As far as this author is aware, no publicly available study has evaluated these
campaigns.”).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 28 (“For such information to be fully internalized by the housing market, a
simple marketing campaign will not suffice.”).
153. See id.
154. Akerlof originally suggested guarantees as a way of overcoming the lemons problem, but
he did so through the lens of brand-name goods. Akerlof, supra note 91, at 499–500. To Akerlof,
however, brand names seem to provide the same protections as warranties in general—they
implicitly assure the buyer of the product’s quality and give the consumer a direct means of
retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations. See id.
155. Id. at 499 (“One natural result of our model is that the risk is borne by the seller rather
than by the buyer.”).
156. Note that although transferring risk is an important solution to the classic lemons
problem, it may be detrimental to the consumer-mortgage market to transfer all risk to the lender,
considering the underlying purpose of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to reduce lender risk and
free up capital for reinvestment in other loans, thereby supporting and strengthening a national
housing market. See supra Part I.A–C (explaining how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac helped create
a stable national housing market).
157. Akerlof, supra note 91, at 500.
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attached to the product, indicating that it has met a certain quality
standard from which the buyer can better judge its true value. 158
Developing solutions that include forms of quality assurance is
important because it can introduce greater uniformity to the coastal
mortgage market and provide safeguards for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. 159
1. Private Mortgage Insurance
One warranty that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac already utilize
to some degree is private mortgage insurance (“PMI”). 160 PMI is a form
of insurance that borrowers are often required to purchase when
making a down payment of less than twenty percent of a home’s
purchase price in order to offset the lender’s risk. 161 If the homeowner
is unable to make the initial twenty percent down payment, the
homeowner can pay a monthly premium for PMI coverage in which a
private insurer pays a portion of the balance due to the mortgage lender
if the borrower defaults. 162 The coverage and monthly premiums
typically end once the mortgage principal balance is less than eighty
percent of the underlying property’s value. 163
When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase mortgage loans
with an outstanding principal balance exceeding eighty percent of the
underlying property value, the GSEs’ charters require them to obtain

158. See id. (describing how licensing counteracts the lemons problem, using education and
licensing in the labor market as an example).
159. “Safeguards” as it is used here is meant to convey the added security that warranties of
mortgage-default risk could provide, since a warranty scheme may allow the GSEs to transfer risk
back to the individual lender or borrower in the event of default.
160. Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements (PMIERS),
FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Fannieand-Freddie-Private-Mortgage-Insurer-Eligibility-Requirements-(PMIERs).aspx (last visited
Sept. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/T4VG-V4CG] [hereinafter PMI Eligibility].
161. Amy Fontinelle, 5 Types of Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI), INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/mortgage/insurance/
(last
updated
June
10,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/XN9M-8ZC8]; see also PMI Eligibility, supra note 160 (requiring private
mortgage insurance for loans exceeding eighty percent LTV ratio).
162. Barbara Marquand, What Is PMI? How Private Mortgage Insurance Works, NERDWALLET
(Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/mortgages/pmi-private-mortgage-insurance
[https://perma.cc/X6RJ-2WPH].
163. Id.

1494

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1467

credit enhancement for the mortgage, 164 usually in the form of PMI. 165
The GSEs and lenders require PMI on these types of loans because they
present greater risk and, in the event of foreclosure, larger loss. 166 A
similar rationale could support amending Fannie Mae’s and Freddie
Mac’s charters to require borrowers to pay for PMI (or some other
acceptable form of credit enhancement) on loans that demonstrate a
sufficient amount of climate-default risk. Since mortgages located in
and around SFHAs carry greater default risk, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac may need to further insulate themselves from potential losses by
requiring homeowners to carry PMI policies. 167 Even though flood
insurance is already required for properties located in SFHAs, those
properties located outside SFHA boundaries that carry similar future
flood risks remain unaccounted for. 168 In the event SFHA maps are
inaccurate or unconcerned with future flood-risk exposure, providing
another avenue for the GSEs to protect against losses is crucial to their
continued success and protecting American taxpayers.
Requiring PMI inherently carries some disadvantages. First,
borrowers typically must pay for PMI until they acquire sufficient
equity such that the “lender no longer considers them high-risk.” 169
Under the Homeowners Protection Act, PMI payments are typically
discontinued when the borrower’s equity reaches twenty percent of the
home’s underlying value. 170 PMI payments may still be required on a
loan, however, if Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s published guidelines
determine the loan remains sufficiently risky despite the borrower
reaching the twenty percent equity threshold. 171 Due to the long-term
nature of SLR, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would likely need to
amend their selling guidelines to require PMI that extends well into a
loan’s life in order to sufficiently protect against climate default.
164. “Credit enhancement” reduces risk by serving as a financial cushion allowing securities
backed by a collateral pool “to absorb losses from defaults on the underlying loans.” Credit FAQ:
The Basics of Credit Enhancement in Securitizations, STANDARD & POOR’S 2 (June 24, 2008),
https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-0624%20S&P%20Basics%20of%20Credit%20Enhancement%20in%20Securitizations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YT5M-F2WX]. In the case of mortgages, the securities are the MBSs, and the
mortgages are the underlying loans that credit enhancement provides protection against in case
of default. Id. at 3.
165. PMI Eligibility, supra note 160.
166. Fontinelle, supra note 161.
167. See Carolyn Kousky, Mark Palim & Ying Pan, Flood Damage and Mortgage Credit Risk:
A Case Study of Hurricane Harvey, 29 J. HOUS. RSCH. S86, S113–14 (2020) (finding that property
damage caused by Hurricane Harvey increased short-term mortgage delinquency and
forebearance both inside and outside of the SFHA).
168. See supra Part I.F (discussing NFIP insurance requirements and flood risk).
169. Fontinelle, supra note 161.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 4901(2).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 4902(g)(1)(a).
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Second, requiring PMI in addition to flood insurance for mortgages in
SFHAs—essentially levying an additional tax on residents—may
discourage growth and hamper economic activities in coastal areas.
Aside from potentially dissuading homeowners from migrating to the
coast, social and economic concerns may arise as a result of making
coastal living more expensive for low-income residents. 172
2. Home Appraisal Standardization
One final option may be to reform the real estate valuation
process so that appraisers recognize and incorporate climate change
risk into real estate values. 173 Although there may be public governance
elements to this approach, standardizing real estate appraisals is most
easily completed through initiatives and cooperation from private
organizations. Giving real estate appraisers the opportunity to obtain a
uniform certificate confirming they have appropriately factored climate
change and flood risk into their valuation would help reduce the
prevalence of lemons in the mortgage market, especially if Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac were to require the certification before purchasing a
loan. 174 Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac already require
objective real estate appraisals, there are relatively few checks on what
qualifies as an objective valuation. 175 Accordingly, the GSEs requiring
flood-hazard certification as an additional condition to purchasing loans
in SFHAs may reduce information gaps and ensure that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac accept loans of consistent and predictable quality. 176
Making the real estate appraisal process uniform sounds
realistic in theory, but it may prove more difficult to accomplish in
reality. Any standardized appraisal process would need to meet the
specifications of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or else it would serve
little benefit in apprising the GSEs of climate-default risk. This
approach would therefore require significant coordination between
private standard-setting bodies and the federal government.
172. Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, CATO
INST.
2
(Oct.
18,
2017),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-823.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8FZ-5PNH].
173. See URB. LAND INST., supra note 1, at 8 (“All agreed that valuation is currently lagging
behind recognition of climate risk and anticipate this changing in the near future.” (emphasis
omitted)).
174. See supra Part II.A (explaining how the lemons problem, when unaddressed, often leads
to more lemons entering the market).
175. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting Fannie Mae’s minimal requirements for
acceptable appraisals).
176. See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text (explaining how warranties can
counteract the lemons problem by providing quality assurances).
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Additionally, this approach assumes that an appraisal standard created
by a private standard-setting body would be enforced consistently. If
the issuing organization failed to maintain uniform application of its
appraisal certificate, the certificate would ultimately carry little
importance because the GSEs would not trust that the climate risk
appraisal was of an acceptable quality. 177
III. SOLUTION: REORIENTING AND STANDARDIZING CLIMATE
INFORMATION
As this Note has addressed, coastal mortgage markets face a
serious problem that deserves increased attention and requires a
solution. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the GSEs charged with securing
consumer home loans, continue to accept risky loans in coastal regions,
subject to default due to SLR and climate change. 178 Local lenders, who
have greater access to regionalized information regarding climatedefault risk for individual properties, have begun offloading their
highest risk mortgages onto the GSEs. 179 While this reduces local
lenders’ risk, it increases the likelihood that the American taxpayer
base will have to shoulder the greater default risk shifted onto Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. 180 The information asymmetry in the coastal
mortgage market can also be viewed as a version of the lemons
problem. 181 To resolve this asymmetrical information gap and allow the
GSEs to better assess the true value of a coastal mortgage, solutions
should focus on three main goals: (1) improving SLR flood modeling
data, (2) increasing disclosure of a mortgage’s flood risk, and (3)
providing the GSEs with warranties and quality assurance.
Decisionmakers should further these goals by establishing a centralized
climate-information network accessible to government and private
actors alike, creating flood-risk maps that convey future changes in
flood frequency and severity, and implementing climate appraisal
certificates for use by appraisers when valuing a home.

177. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 137 (2013) (“All of this private activity might be meaningless or even harmful if it is just greenwashing—private activity designed to give the appearance of environmental benefits without
delivering actual benefits.”).
178. See supra Part I.F
179. See supra Part I.F.
180. See supra Part I.F.
181. See supra Part II.A.
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A. Looking for Silver Buckshot, Not a Silver Bullet
Given the complexity of this issue, it is unlikely that a single
solution could meet every goal and still have a realistic chance of
implementation. 182 Although some may find the solutions this Note
proposes unfocused, there is ample evidence that the best approach to
solving multi-faceted problems is through silver buckshot rather than
a search for a silver bullet. 183 In areas as complex as mortgage
regulation and climate change, it is doubtful that a single panacea
exists for systemic problems. 184 Thus, a mix of public and private
actions, taken in concert and designed to supplement one another, poses
the best opportunity to alleviate burdens currently placed on the GSEs
and improve the efficiency and long-term resiliency of the coastal
mortgage market. 185
Additionally, a mix of public and private sector responses is
necessary for climate change solutions due to an increasingly partisan
divide in the United States, especially with regard to how climate
change should be addressed. 186 Recent attempts to pass climate-driven
policies have demonstrated that climatic issues can further drive a
wedge between ideological camps, making enactment of broad reforms
a particularly difficult task. 187 Despite efforts to develop new public
182. See MAXWELL BOYKOFF, CREATIVE (CLIMATE) COMMUNICATIONS: PRODUCTIVE PATHWAYS
SCIENCE, POLICY, AND SOCIETY 190–217 (2019) (discussing “silver buckshot” for complex
problems); John Lawn, Silver Bullets vs. Silver Buckshot, FOOD MGMT. (Aug. 01, 2008),
https://www.food-management.com/market-trends-amp-opinions/silver-bullets-vs-silver-buckshot
[https://perma.cc/3KV8-P74Y] (noting “that there are few serious problems that lend themselves
to one-shot solutions”).
183. Lawn, supra note 182. To help those unfamiliar with gun-related terminology, buckshot
refers to a type of shotgun ammunition comprised of many small, tightly packed individual pellets
that disperse when fired. As opposed to a bullet which makes a single focused impact on its target,
buckshot typically produces many smaller impacts over a wider area.
184. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. ENV’T
L. 217, 295–96 (2015). Commonly referred to as a “panacea bias,” strong attractions to a single,
cure-all solution can often distract decisionmakers from other, less comprehensive responses. Id.
(“The attraction of having one measure that promises a comprehensive response to a problem is so
compelling that it can induce experts to treat other strategies as distractions or competitors.”).
185. See id. at 296 (noting Elinor Ostrom’s contention that decisionmakers who inaccurately
conflate their simple solutions with messy reality are unaware of “the diverse institutional
arrangements that operate in practice”).
186. Nadja Popovich, Climate Change Rises as a Public Priority. But It’s More Partisan than
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2020),
Ever.,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/20/climate/climate-change-polls.html
[https://perma.cc/EQ56-CS39].
187. See Abel Gustafson, Seth A. Rosenthal, Matthew T. Ballew, Matthew H. Goldberg,
Parrish Bergquist, John E. Kotcher, Edward W. Maibach & Anthony Leiserowitz, The Development
of Partisan Polarization Over the Green New Deal, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 940 (2019)
(examining the increasing partisan divide surrounding the Green New Deal).
FOR
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governance schemes, no major federal environmental statutes (let alone
climate change statutes) have been enacted since the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 188 leaving the likelihood of successful reform
through legislation or long-term regulation unpredictable at best. For
this reason, involving the private sector in solutions will provide a
mechanism for the free market to coerce change when positive law
efforts fail. 189
B. Centralize Climate Information
Of the solutions this Note proposes, centralizing climate
information is likely the most important because it lays the groundwork
for other silver buckshot in the future. A centralized climateinformation network likewise meets multiple goals necessary to address
the lemons problem: it facilitates greater access to, and disclosure of,
important climate information, and it delegates flood modeling research
to those agencies and actors best equipped to conduct that research. As
noted above, the fragmentation of federal climate-information efforts
has proven a formidable roadblock in the U.S. government’s efforts to
address the climate change crisis. 190 With numerous federal entities
engaging in separate climate activities, and even withholding valuable
information from other entities, progress in the public sphere has not
been able to reach its full potential. 191 To coordinate climate activities
and satisfy informational needs across all levels of governance,
lawmakers should direct a federal agency to serve a managerial role
and organize the federal government’s climate-related efforts. 192
Further, lawmakers should pursue reforms aimed at reducing agency
overlap since reducing overlap may free up substantial funds for other
projects.
Facing the climate crisis is an inherently interagency activity,
and the success of future climate-change programs and reforms will
depend on cooperation among various governmental bodies. 193 As the
situation currently stands, most climate programs in the federal

188. Vandenbergh, supra note 177, at 131.
189. See id. at 138 (“If government is unable to act, an imperfect private governance measure
may be preferable to the hypothetical public measure so long as the private measure is efficient
and effective, and does not decrease the chance of a better public or private action.”).
190. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the fragmentation of federal climate-information
efforts).
191. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 128, at 16.
192. See id. at 46–47.
193. Id. at 18.
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government are designed to meet individual agency needs. 194 If
coordinating climate information is to be prioritized at the federal level,
climate-information efforts should be developed with broad
applicability in mind. This means developing interagency missions for
climate programs, reducing redundancies across the various climate
programs, and encouraging collaboration between private and public
entities.
Understandably, creating a coordinated climate-information
network at the federal level primarily involves distinctly federal
actions. 195 Beginning in 2009, the Government Accountability Office
recommended “that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office
of the President, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, state
and local governments, and key congressional committees of
jurisdiction, develop a strategic plan to guide the nation’s efforts to
adapt to climate change.” 196 In order to streamline the distribution of
climate information to decisionmakers, clear roles, responsibilities, and
interagency working relationships need to be established among
federal, state, local, and private actors. 197
This initiative is important to improving flood modeling since
the federal government is the only entity with the ability to provide “a
full suite of forecasting, modeling, observations, and other
information.” 198 And although the federal government may hold a high
volume of climate research that is easily accessible, the federal
government is not nearly as adept at making information useful for
decisionmakers. 199 Thus, the need for an integrated climateinformation network highlights why simply increasing funding for
climate modeling research is an ineffective solution. Even if funds were
appropriated to various agencies to generate better flood models, there
is no guarantee the updated models would reach decisionmakers in
FEMA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. For future climate information
to have a tangible impact and improve the accuracy of SFHAs, a
194. See id. at 15 (“The federal government’s climate information . . . is fragmented across
many individual agencies that use the information in different ways to meet their respective
missions.”).
195. See id. at 41 (mentioning findings that motivating decisionmakers to use climate
information is best accomplished through distinctly federal actions like statutory and strategic
plans).
196. Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-113, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:
STRATEGIC FEDERAL PLANNING COULD HELP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MAKE MORE INFORMED
DECISIONS (2009).
197. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 128, at 41.
198. Id. at 42.
199. Id.
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comprehensive climate-information network must be developed to
ensure future research is not wasted. 200
Despite the resources available to the federal government,
assuming that this approach is entirely within the ambit of the federal
government would be inappropriate. In fact, nonfederal, technical
assistance in developing a consolidated climate-information network is
required due to the federal government’s lack of resources. 201 In other
words, although the government has access to a larger pool of funds
than any other single organization, it still does not have the resources
to tackle the climate problem on its own. 202 Private sector assistance
would minimize the need for a single government agency to possess all
necessary expertise and would provide added flexibility to the
system. 203 While the specific roles private and public entities play in
developing a centralized climate-information hub are best left to
individual decisionmakers, public-private cooperation should be
prioritized as a single entity cannot be expected to bear the full
development burden. 204
C. Provide Future Flood Risk Estimates
Next, public and private entities need to do a better job of
incorporating dynamic SLR flood risk into their industry activities and
showing market participants that flood risk is not a static
measurement. The best way to accomplish this objective is to include
flood-hazard projections in publications and in policy-setting tools, and
to do so for properties both inside and outside current SFHA
boundaries. This serves two purposes: First, it improves the accuracy of
flood-hazard tools (like FIRMs and SFHA boundaries) and provides a
more complete picture of a property’s evolving flood risk. 205 Second, it
communicates to residents and decisionmakers that climate-change
and SLR risks are constantly changing and that flood hazards are
200. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of accessible
climate information).
201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 128, at 44.
202. In this context, “resources” also refers to the relationships, or lack thereof, the federal
government has with local communities that would help promote the effectiveness of a centralized
climate-information network. See id. (noting that the federal government does not have a local
presence).
203. Id. at 44–45.
204. Id. at 44–46. It may be helpful to reference climate networks in other countries when
deciding how to structure a U.S. information hub. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Climate
Ready Support Service operates as a central hub to help decisionmakers use climate information
effectively and “provides tools, information, and practical advice to help businesses and other
organizations adapt to the effects of climate change.” Id. at 45.
205. See Kousky, supra note 104, at 28 (noting variation in flood risk).
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present and likely to grow outside SFHAs over the mortgage’s
lifetime. 206 This option should also be preferred over an educational
marketing campaign. While educational outreach is important, there is
already a well-established initiative in place through FEMA’s
FloodSmart campaign. 207 Limited time and money are better spent on
reforms that are more likely to have a direct impact on climateinformation disclosure. 208
Future flood risks should be disclosed at all levels of the market
to ensure information asymmetries are narrowed as much as possible.
For instance, FEMA should begin including data on future flood
hazards in FIRMs, specifically in relation to the effects of SLR, erosion,
and changing precipitation patterns. 209 One way to effectively convey
this information without substantially altering current FIRMs is to
develop “Future FIRMs.” Future FIRMs would be maps solely devoted
to communicating projected changes in flood risk and allowing presentday decisionmakers to make better long-term policy choices at the
federal, state, and local level. 210
Moreover, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to include future
flood risk in their loan selling criteria so they can better account for the
true present and future value of a mortgage in purchasing decisions.
Fannie Mae may opt to directly update its selling guidelines such that
certain data on future flood risk is incorporated in a loan’s risk
evaluation, or more drastically, the GSEs may require properties in a
500-year floodplain to purchase flood insurance before the properties
are eligible for purchase. Conversely, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may
206. See id. (discussing communication of flood risk over the life of a mortgage).
207. See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text (describing the FloodSmart marketing
campaign).
208. See Kousky, supra note 104, at 28 (“For such information to be fully internalized by the
housing market, a simple marketing campaign will not suffice.”). Rejecting marketing campaigns
as an ideal solution should not be taken as rejecting their importance entirely. Educational
outreach plays an important role in resolving information asymmetries and increasing public
awareness, which may help stimulate government involvement.
209. See id. at 14 (discussing FIRMs).
210. See id. at 28 (“[N]ew policy tools are needed to link housing and development decisions
with information on hazard risks and their projected changes.”). It might be helpful to think of
Future FIRMs as a parallel to Future Land Use (“FLU”) maps—a common tool in the land use
planning context that provides community residents and developers with a visual guide to a
municipality’s future planning. See Douglas Miskowiak, Citizen’s Guide to Future Land Use
Mapping, UNIV. OF WIS.–STEVENS POINT 4 (Aug. 2006), https://www.uwsp.edu/cnrap/clue/Documents/DataMappingGIS/Citizen_Guide_Future_Land_Use_Mapping.pdf
[https://perma.cc/334Y-FAXF] (explaining FLU maps). FLU maps are not exact predictions of the
future, instead providing an estimation of what a community may look like over a given span of
time. Id. This principal is important to keep in mind for Future FIRMs, since exact predictions of
SLR flood risk are unlikely.
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indirectly include future flood risk in their loan evaluations if FEMA
sufficiently updates SFHAs and FIRMs to include growing and
changing flood risk. If appropriate mechanisms are put in place, the
GSEs will be better positioned to reject loans not currently located in
SFHAs but which face a high probability of climate default over the
loan’s lifetime.
To supplement government efforts and ensure dynamic floodhazard information is widely accessible in the event of political gridlock
or routine delays, private entities should also prioritize publicizing
future flood risks to borrowers and lenders. 211 This effort may require
focusing limited resources on particularly vulnerable coastal
communities that pose the highest climate-default risk to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. Although these efforts might not be as comprehensive
as a federal initiative, providing supplemental information to borrowers
and lenders is a potentially helpful way to circumvent the political and
economic forces working against public efforts. 212
D. Standardize the Real Estate Appraisal Process
Lastly, decisionmakers in the public and private sectors should
attempt to standardize how real estate appraisers factor present and
future climate risk into property valuations. This standardization
would reduce information asymmetry and the lemons problem by acting
as a warranty that appraisers and lenders can provide to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in order to assure them of loan quality. Creating a
uniform climate-risk certification system will likely require some
reforms to the industry as it currently exists. 213 Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac currently only require an objective appraisal for a loan to
conform. 214 Yet, there is no guarantee an objective appraisal seriously

211. See Vandenbergh, supra note 177, at 138 (listing ways in which private-governance
mechanisms may serve to counteract or supplement government inaction).
212. See Kousky, supra note 104, at 28 (“Unfortunately, there are many political and economic
forces working against more stringent land use in high-risk areas.”).
213. Creating a uniform climate-risk certification system is stated as a conditional possibility
because it may be more feasible to simply update the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice (“USPAP”)—an ethical and performance standard for the appraisal profession adopted by
Congress, compliance with which is required for state-certified appraisers involved in federally
FOUND.,
related
real
estate
transactions.
What
is
USPAP?,
APPRAISAL
https://www.appraisalfoundation.org/imis/TAF/Standards/Appraisal_Standards/Uniform_Standa
rds_of_Professional_Appraisal_Practice/TAF/USPAP.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/57D8-XZNB].
214. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (Fannie Mae appraisal requirements).
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considers climate risk without some standard or certification assuring
the GSEs they are purchasing a loan of acceptable quality. 215
For climate-risk certification to be effective, certain items need
to be addressed. Notably, the certification process must be enforced
consistently and must use measurements that accurately quantify
current and future flood risks into home valuations. Producing accurate
determinations of dynamic flood risks will likely require a partnership
between FEMA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a private standardsetting body to ensure appropriate measurement techniques are
developed and agreed upon by all relevant parties. 216 Moreover, getting
the GSEs to accept such standards is necessary to effect widespread
change and acceptance in the real estate appraisal community. If
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require climate-risk certification before
purchasing loans, lenders are more likely to seek appraisers who are
willing to satisfy climate-risk certification requirements. Thus,
involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the development of a private
standard is paramount to stimulating widespread acceptance among
appraisers and to creating necessary change in how coastal homes are
valued.
While successful implementation of an industry-wide
standardization may seem farfetched, it presents a better solution than
requiring PMI for properties in SFHAs. 217 PMI would essentially act as
an additional tax on coastal homeowners who have minimal control
over their homes’ individual flood risk. Indeed, PMI may do more harm
than good. Introducing additional costs to coastal living may force lowincome residents from their homes and increase risk to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as homeowners are forced to choose between paying PMI
monthly and staying current on mortgage payments. 218 In truth, it may
be difficult to successfully implement a widespread warranty system to
shift climate-default risk from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
individual borrowers. Yet, as previously noted, silver buckshot is what
we should be looking for, and reforms of all sizes and complexity that

215. See supra notes 154–159 and accompanying text (noting that providing warranties and
quality assurance to the GSEs may counteract the lemons problem).
216. Accordingly, the USPAP may be the most appropriate private standard-setting body since
it was previously adopted by Congress in 1989 and is managed under an existing private-public
relationship. See APPRAISAL FOUND., supra note 213.
217. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text (noting the weaknesses of requiring
PMI).
218. See Fontinelle, supra note 161 (cautioning that PMI adds an additional variable monthly
cost to mortgage payments since PMI payments are relative to the outstanding loan balance).
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better inform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of loan risk should be
investigated. 219
CONCLUSION
Under the current framework, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do
not have the appropriate mechanisms in place to allow them to
successfully assess the climate-default risk of the coastal mortgages
they secure. 220 If coastal lenders continue to offload their riskiest loans
onto Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taxpayers may end up shouldering
the consequences as sea levels rise and fewer borrowers are able to
continue making mortgage payments. 221 One way to address this issue
is by viewing it as a lemons problem. Mortgages subject to increased
SLR flooding are “lemons” because they are riskier, and thus less
valuable, than the typical mortgage Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
would insure—yet coastal lenders have been able to market them as
safe investments. 222 If left unchecked, climate-sensitive loans may
increasingly populate the mortgage market and ultimately leave the
GSEs overleveraged. 223
This Note uses well-known answers to the lemons problem as a
means of identifying viable solutions to fix information asymmetries in
the mortgage market and to identify potential strategies for future
decisionmakers. Flood models should be constantly updated and
improved to provide Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the most
accurate information and representations of current and future climatedefault risk; accurate measurements of loan risk need to be effectively
communicated to borrowers, lenders, and the GSEs to better solve
information asymmetries; and warranties or quality guarantees must
be developed so Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can transfer some
climate-default risk back onto borrowers and lenders.
Decisionmakers should utilize three separate yet related
approaches to meet these objectives. First, public and private actors
should work in tandem to centralize climate information and ensure
more concentrated and coordinated diffusion of climate information into
the hands of policymakers and private entities. This effort will likely
result in more efficient risk disclosure to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

219.
issues).
220.
221.
222.
223.

See supra Part III.A (explaining the preference for “silver buckshot” in response to climate
See discussion supra Part I.F.
Flavelle, supra note 9.
See supra Part II.A (discussing the lemons problem).
See supra Part II.A.
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and may encourage development of more accurate flood models. 224
Second, FEMA should publish Future FIRMs that communicate
projected changes to properties’ flood risks inside and outside SFHA
boundaries. Correspondingly, private organizations should take steps
to convey similar information to the public and may need to focus
disclosure efforts on those communities that pose the greatest risk to
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and, ultimately, taxpayers. Finally, attempts
should be made to standardize the real estate appraisal industry and
develop a certification process that appraisers can use to verify that
climate risk has been adequately factored into property valuation. 225
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can then require these certifications from
lenders as a conforming loan requirement, and the GSEs can better
assess the riskiness and underlying value of the loans they choose to
purchase.
Although the issues presented in this Note can surely be solved
through other mechanisms, approaching information asymmetries in
coastal mortgage markets as a variation of the lemons problem may
make identifying avenues for reform easier for future scholars and
decisionmakers. Regardless, the first step to protecting Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and American taxpayers is recognizing that a problem
exists. Hopefully, this Note will prompt public and private
decisionmakers at all levels to take that step and implement reforms
for future economic and environmental adaptation.

Peyton J. Klein *

224. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 128, at 46–47 (recommending
development of a federal climate-information network utilizing both public and private entities).
225. As mentioned previously, the USPAP has already standardized the appraisal profession
a substantial amount. See APPRAISAL FOUND., supra note 213 (explaining that the USPAP are the
“generally recognized ethical and performance standards for the appraisal profession”). Thus, this
solution may simply require amending existing standards to reflect the impacts of changing flood
risk on property values. See id. (“USPAP is updated every two years so that appraisers have the
information they need to deliver unbiased and thoughtful opinions of value.”).
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